000			03736cam a2200517xi 4500
001			ebs1152424272
003			OCoLC
005			20211114101713.0
006			m o d
007			cr |||||||||||
008			200421s2021 njub ob 001 0 eng
010			_a2020017879
020			_z9780691193311
035			_a2583255
035			_a(OCoLC)1152424272
037			_aebs2583255
040			_aDLC _beng _erda _cDLC _dOCLCQ _dOCLCF _dYDX _dOCLCO _dN$T
042			_apcc
043			_aa-sy--- _an-us---
049			_aGWRE
050	0	4	_aDS98.6 _b.R335 2021
100	1		_aRabinovich, Itamar, _d1942- _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aSyrian Requiem : _bthe civil war and its aftermath / _cItamar Rabinovich, Carmit Valensi.
260			_aUS: _bPrinceton University Press, _c2021.
300			_a1 online resource (xiv, 271 pages) : _bmaps.
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505	0		_aThe Ba'th in Power, 1963-2011 -- The Syrian Civil War and Crisis, 2011-018 -- The Domestic Scene -- The Regional Arena -- International Actors -- Syria 2019-2020 -- Conclusion : From the Syrian civil war to the lingering Syrian crisis.
520			_a"The Syrian crisis is not over yet but the period of full-fledged civil war in that country appears to be drawing to a close, and it is now possible to view this calamity with some perspective. This short book will address the following questions about the conflict: How and why did quiet demonstrations in Southern Syria develop into a brutal civil war? Why did the political opposition to the regime of Bashar al-Assad remain weak and divided? How did radical Jihadi Islamists take over the main military opposition to the Syrian regime? How did the Syrian conflict become a main arena of the Saudi-Iranian regional rivalry? What explains the ambivalent Western attitude towards the Syrian rebellion? How did US policy under the Obama administration evolve and why did both Obama and Trump decide not to make a major investment in it? How stable is the status quo? And how could the conflict re-erupt in a different form? According to Rabinovitch, the Syrian regime and its supporters (including the Russians and the Iranians) have indeed emerged as victors, but it's a limited victory at best. The Syrian state under Assad controls only about 60 percent of the national territory and the potential for renewed violence is considerable. Assad's continued survival has come at the cost of deep dependency on Iran and Russia; his is now, arguably, a vassal state. This means that the country will remain in crisis for the foreseeable future, even if the full-scale civil war phase has come to an end. In his last chapter, Rabinovich will recommend policy options for the U.S"--
590			_aAdded to collection customer.56279.3.
650		7	_aDiplomatic relations. _2fast
650		7	_aPolitics and government. _2fast
651		0	_aSyria _xHistory _yCivil War, 2011-
651		0	_aSyria _xPolitics and government _y2000-
651		0	_aSyria _xForeign relations _y21st century.
651		0	_aSyria _xForeign relations _zUnited States.
651		0	_aUnited States _xForeign relations _zSyria.
651		7	_aSyria. _2fast
651		7	_aUnited States. _2fast
655		7	_aHistory. _2fast
700	1		_aValensi, Carmit, _d1980- _eauthor.
776	0	8	_iPrint version: _aRabinovich, Itamar, 1942- _tSyrian requiem _dPrinceton : Princeton University Press, 2021. _z9780691193311 _w(DLC) 2020017878.
856	4	0	_uhttps://colorado.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=2583255 _zFull Text (via EBSCO)
907			_a.b117402576 _b03-01-21 _c02-24-21
942			_2lcc _cBK
956			_aEBSCO ebook collection
999			_c4972 _d4972